Chapter 6 - The Override

The credentials system is the backbone of Air Force maintenance.
Every maintenance action on every aircraft in the Air Force is documented in a system called IMDS — the Integrated Maintenance Data System. Every work order, every release, every red X, every sign-off, every certification, and every override is recorded in IMDS. The record is permanent. The record is auditable. The record is the truth.
When a maintenance specialist signs a work order, they sign it with their credentials. Their credentials are stored on a common access card — a CAC — that they insert into a reader at their workstation. The CAC has a chip. The chip has a digital certificate. The certificate is tied to the user's identity. When the specialist signs a work order, the system records the signature, the timestamp, the workstation, and the identity of the user.
When a maintenance officer overrides a work order — for example, to release an aircraft after a maintenance discrepancy — the officer must enter their own credentials. The override is recorded in the system. The override is recorded with the officer's name. The override is recorded with a justification code. The override is recorded with a note that says why the override was made.
If the override was made without the officer's credentials, the override was not made by the officer. It was made by someone else. Someone who used the officer's credentials. Someone who had access to the officer's CAC.
Or someone who had access to the workstation where the officer's credentials were entered.
Or someone who had access to a master override code — a code that only two officers in the maintenance group possess: the group commander and the maintenance officer.
The maintenance officer is Major Eric Bolton.
The group commander is Colonel Daniel Whitfield.
The master override code was used on the twelfth of May at 21:14.
It was used from the workstation in the maintenance group commander's office.
It was used to enter a forged signature in the name of Staff Sergeant Jasmine Cole.
And it was used to release aircraft 86-0274 for flight.
The system recorded the credentials as Staff Sergeant Cole.
But the system also recorded the master override code that had been used to enter the credentials.
And the master override code that had been used belonged to Major Eric Bolton.
Colonel Vasquez found it on the sixth day.
She sat in the conference room and she looked at the screen of the IMDS terminal and she said, quietly, to the empty room, "There it is."
She picked up her phone and she called the wing commander.
She said, "Sir, I have identified the officer who entered the forged signature. It was Major Eric Bolton. He used his master override code. He used it from the workstation in the maintenance group commander's office. He entered Staff Sergeant Cole's credentials and he signed the release. And he did it because he had been told by the group commander that the aircraft had to be back on the flying schedule by the fourteenth."
The wing commander said, "Colonel Vasquez, are you sure about the group commander?"
"Sir, I am sure. I have the email. It is dated 11 MAY. It was sent by the group commander to Major Bolton. It says, 'I need 86-0274 back on the schedule by Thursday. I do not care how you do it. Make it happen.'"
The wing commander was quiet.
Then he said, "Colonel Vasquez, I am going to relieve Major Bolton of duty at 08:00 tomorrow. I am going to relieve Colonel Whitfield of duty at the same time. I am going to refer both of them for court-martial. And I am going to personally call Staff Sergeant Cole and tell her that she has been restored to duty."
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"Sir, thank you."
"No, Colonel. Thank you."